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ABSTRACT
The growing popularity of IP telephony systems has made
them attractive targets for spammers. Voice call spam, also
known as Spam over Internet Telephony (SPIT), is poten-
tially a more serious problem than email spam because of the
real time processing requirements of voice packets. We ex-
plore a novel mechanism that uses duration of calls between
users to combat SPIT. CallRank, the scheme proposed by
us, uses call duration to establish social network linkages
and global reputations for callers, based on which call re-
cipients can decide whether the caller is legitimate or not.
CallRank has been implemented within a VoIP system sim-
ulation and our results show that we are able to achieve a
false negative rate of 10% and a false positive rate of 3%
even in the presence of a signiﬁcant fraction of spammers.
1. INTRODUCTION
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) systems rely on an IP
network to set up voice calls and transmit voice packets. The
growing popularity of VoIP, the relatively low cost of access
to IP networks, and the vulnerabilities that exist in systems
connected to such networks makes VoIP an attractive tool
for spammers. Spammers and telemarketers will use SPIT
to make unsolicited calls and to send voice mails for the
same purposes for which email spam is currently used. SPIT
would not only degrade our conﬁdence in telephony but it
would be more diﬃcult to handle because of the real-time
processing requirements of voice calls. Examples of large
scale SPIT already exist - a company sent out voice mails
to all its customers detailing its initial public oﬀering[15].
If we are not able to combat SPIT eﬀectively, we face an
unhappy future where picking up a ringing phone would be
a frustrating experience and voice mailboxes would become
clogged with advertisements for unwanted products.
The ﬁrst stage of voice communication is call setup, a
handshake mechanism between the caller and the call re-
cipient after which the phones start ringing. At this stage
the only information available is the identity of the caller
and the call recipient. It is only after the call recipient ac-
cepts the call, that voice media is exchanged. A spam engine
that ﬁlters based on the media content, however successful
∗This work was supported in part by funding provided by
IBM ISS and AT&T.
CEAS2007-FourthConferenceonEmailandAnti-Spam,August2-3,2007,
Mountain View, California USA
it is, will not be able to prevent the phone from constantly
ringing. In addition voice packets, unlike email, must be de-
livered to the user synchronously. Any delay in delivery due
to spam engine processing will result in degraded call qual-
ity. Thus, an eﬀective method for dealing with SPIT must
rely on the identity of the caller rather than call content.
However, determining the exact identity of a user on the
internet is a hard problem. It is suﬃcient if we are able to
diﬀerentiate between a legitimate caller and a spammer. In
this paper, our focus is on developing a scheme that achieves
this goal.
This paper proposes CallRank, a novel mechanism built
around call duration, to diﬀerentiate between a legitimate
user and a spammer. Our approach is motivated by the sim-
ple observation that a legitimate user typically makes and
receives calls and many of the calls last for signiﬁcant dura-
tions. On the other hand a spammer’s/telemarketer’s goal is
to deliver information to as many people as possible by mak-
ing a large number of relatively brief calls. A spammer will
typically receive no calls or a much smaller number of calls.
The diﬀerence in call patterns is that, for a spammer, the
call pattern is largely unidirectional while it is bidirectional
for legitimate users. We take advantage of this diﬀerence
in call patterns and use call duration to create call creden-
tials that callers can provide to call recipients as proof of an
implicit level of trust.
The following simple scenario shows how our call creden-
tial based approach can be used to identify spammers. As-
sume that Alice makes a call to Bob. If Bob picks up the
phone and talks to Alice a call credential can be generated,
after completion of the call, signifying that Bob and Alice
trust each other enough to have talked for the duration of
their call. The longer the call duration, stronger is the call
credential. Intuition suggests that if a user receives calls of
signiﬁcant duration on a regular basis it is likely that he
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is a legitimate user and not a spammer. There are several
ways in which call credentials can be created when calls are
made. For example, when Alice calls Bob and talks to him
for time t, she can create a call credential and provide it to
Bob. It is also possible that the recipient of the call, Bob,
generates a call credential for Alice or both generate call
credentials for each other. In this paper, however, we ex-
plore a mechanism where a caller provides a call credential
to the call recipient when he makes a call and speaks to the
call recipient.
For each user we use these call credentials to determine
1we use the pronoun he for both users and spammers for
the sake of convenienceFigure 1: SIP Call Trapezoid
Social Network (SN)[1] linkages, thus enabling us to distin-
guish between legitimate users and spammers. We also use
call duration along with the Eigentrust algorithm[10] to de-
velop a global view of the reputation of all users who either
belong to or interact with a domain. For a spammer to be
successful in a system that employs CallRank, he must get
other legitimate users to call and speak to him for signif-
icantly long durations. We believe this will be extremely
hard as people rarely call up a spammer. If they inadver-
tently do make a call to a spammer, the conversation will
not last for very long.
The following are the key contributions of this paper:
• We introduce call duration based credentials as the
uniform underlying mechanism to support a number
of techniques to determine if a caller is a spammer.
• We explore the use of SNs based on call credentials to
allow two users to make a call.
• If SN linkages are unavailable between users, we use a
variation of the Eigentrust algorithm to assign global
reputations based on call durations.
• We perform a detailed evaluation of CallRank and
show that we are able to achieve low false negative
and low false positive rates even in the presence of a
signiﬁcant fraction of spammers.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses
VoIP basics, SNs, Eigentrust algorithm and other related
work that deals with the spam problem. The key compo-
nents of CallRank are presented in Section 3. An evaluation
of CallRank and its results are discussed in Section 4. This
is followed by conclusion and future work in Section 5.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 VoIP Fundamentals
VoIP is the umbrella term given to a set of protocols that
allow the routing of voice calls over the internet (IP net-
work). The signaling can be enabled using either the Ses-
sion Initiation Protocol (SIP)[14], proposed by the IETF or
H.323[18] proposed by the ITU. Our solution is applicable
to either of these protocols but in our discussions we assume
SIP is used for signalling.
For two users to communicate with each other using SIP,
they need to know each other’s SIP URIs (Uniform Resource
Identiﬁer). SIP then uses an application overlay consisting
of proxy servers and location services to locate these end
points. A typical SIP call trapezoid is shown in Figure 1.
When Alice identiﬁed by SIP URI sip:alice@wonderland.com,
calls Bob, sip:bob@music.org, the call request message, known
as the INV ITE message, is sent to the proxy server respon-
sible for the wonderland.com domain, P1. P1 then deter-
mines how to route the call to the proxy responsible for
Bob’s domain, music.org, P2. Once P2 receives the request
it looks up user Bob and then routes it to the appropriate
endpoint. On receipt of the INV ITE message Bob’s user
agent (UA) starts to ring, shown by the 180 Ringing in Fig-
ure 1. When Bob picks up the phone the UA sends a 200 OK
message. This initial message exchange forms the call setup
transaction. When Bob or Alice hang up, the respective UA
sends a BY E message and this initiates the call tear-down
transaction. Call duration represents the time between the
end of call setup (200 OK) to the start of call teardown
(BY E) (see Figure 1). Call duration is the basic building
block of the CallRank scheme proposed in this paper.
2.2 Social Networks
In CallRank, SNs are used to decide when to accept a
call credential. SNs model associations that exist between
a set of entities (typically humans). A distinctive feature
of these networks is their tendency to cluster, measured by
the clustering coeﬃcient[21]. Mathematically an SN can be
described as a graph G = (V,E), where V , the set of ver-
tices/nodes represent people and E, the set of edges repre-
sents some relationship/association between the people. G
is referred to as the community. Consider a three vertex
community consisting of nodes A, B and C. If a particular
node, A, is connected to the other two nodes, B and C, then
for the community to exhibit a high clustering coeﬃcient B
and C must also be connected. This tendency to form trian-
gles from wedges is the nature of a highly clustered SN. In
a voice communication system if there is a scenario where
user A calls user B and user B calls user C, then due to
the similar clustering nature in these systems, it is highly
likely that user C will at some point call user A. This high
likelihood coupled with call credentials is used in CallRank
to provide a local mechanism to determine if a caller is a
spammer or not.
2.3 Eigentrust
The Eigentrust algorithm[10] is used to determine the rep-
utation of a set of peers based on their interactions. Each
peer i decides a normalized local trust value for another peer
j, based on the number of satisfactory and unsatisfactory
transactions it has had with that peer. This value is repre-
sented as cij. It then uses a transitive notion of trust to ag-
gregate these local trust values to a system wide reputation
value for all peers. If
− →
t represents a vector containing the
system wide reputation values, the Eigentrust algorithm can
be used to determine this vector by solving
− →
t = (C
T)
n ∗− → e
for n = large number of iterations. C is the matrix con-
taining the normalized local trust values [cij], ∀i,j. − → e is a
vector with unit 1-norm with its ith component ei = 1/m,where m is the total number of peers in the system.
− →
t con-
verges to the left principal eigenvector of C, assuming that
− → e has a component in the direction of the corresponding
dominant eigenvector. In general, computing the nth power
of the matrix (C
T) should be avoided and instead one should
iteratively reassign the vector
− →
t as
− →
t = (C
T)∗
− →
t with the
initial value of
− →
t = − → e . This method (known as the power
method) for computing the eigenvector, that corresponds to
the largest eigenvalue of the matrix, will converge with any
initial vector for
− →
t , as long as the initial vector has a com-
ponent in the direction of the dominant eigenvector. In case
there exists pre-trusted peers P we need to ensure that these
end up with high reputations. Therefore to converge faster
we can use − → p , instead of − → e where pi = 1/|P| if i ǫ P and
pi = 0 otherwise. The system to solve, in the presence of
pre-trusted peers, is
− →
t = (C
T)
n ∗ − → p .
2.4 Related Work
Rosenberg and Jennings provide a good reference for the
possible solutions that can be explored for VoIP spam which
among others, include Content Filtering, Black and White
lists, Turing tests and Computational puzzles [13]. We dis-
cuss this along with other related work based on the spam
detection methodology used in the next few paragraphs.
In [13], [4] and [7], techniques used for combating email
spam such as Blacklists, Statistical Blacklists, Greylists and
Consent Based Systems are adapted for VoIP spam. The
techniques mentioned above are subverted easily by the cre-
ation of new identities, a mechanism used in attacks such
as the Sybil attack[5]. We show that CallRank, however,
is more resistant to these kind of attacks in Section 3.3.1.
In [17], [16] and [20], spam detection techniques based on
anomalous characteristics of a spam call are described. How-
ever, it seems fairly simple for a spammer to subvert the de-
tection of these characteristics and make a spam call. Strong
authentication is probably the best counter measure against
SPIT, however techniques based on DKIM[8], P-Asserted-
Identity[9] and SAML[19] speciﬁed in [17] and [13] will only
be successful when adopted by a large number of users.
Establishing absolute identity on the Internet is always
going to be a hard problem. Reputation based techniques
use the Internet’s inherent democratic nature to provide a
practical and eﬀective alternatives. [4], [12] suggest the use
of buddy lists and user ratings for buddies to create dynamic
localized Whitelists. However, this restricts the scope of
users that can call to strictly the user’s SN linkage and it
requires explicit user feedback in the form ratings. CallRank
on the other hand, uses call duration, which is recorded
automatically by the system without requiring explicit user
action.
The transitive nature of social networks has been explored
in [2], while the use of global reputation scheme to deter-
mine reputation values is present in [3]. These systems were
designed to prevent email spam and use email relevant met-
rics to detect SN linkages and calculate reputation. They
do not address the cryptographic security of their metrics.
In CallRank we use call duration as the metric and crypto-
graphically secure it using local signatures.Finally, the use
of Turing tests or Client puzzles as suggested by [13], if used
in a stand-alone fashion, leads to longer and more annoying
call setup times. However, when combined with CallRank
they can be used to reduce false positives of the CallRank
system even further.
Figure 2: Reputation credential - Call Duration
3. CALLRANK
3.1 Voice Call Duration
Consider a call from Alice to Bob where the call duration
is 10 minutes, as shown in Figure 2. This, to us, repre-
sents an implicit statement that Alice trusts Bob enough to
speak to him for 10 minutes. On termination of the call Al-
ice’s user agent (UA) will then automatically hand a secure
call credential to Bob stating that ”Alice spoke to Bob for
10 minutes”, represented by CCAB. We ensure its security
through cryptographic primitives discussed in Section 3.5.
The next section discusses how we can combine this creden-
tial and SN theory to determine what call credentials can
be trusted.
3.2 Using SNs to Accept a Call Credential
Consider, once again, the system as described in Figure
2, following which Bob talks to Charlie for 15 minutes. At
this point Bob’s UA hands a credential capturing this infor-
mation to Charlie, CCBC. At a later point in time assume
Charlie tries to call Alice. If Charlie’s UA presents CCBC to
Alice’s UA at call setup time, then Alice can accept the call
since she knows Bob (as she has recorded information of the
call from her to Bob). In a general scenario the caller UA
will present to the call recipient’s UA a set of credentials
when initiating a call. The call recipient’s UA will see if
any of the credentials can be used to establish a SN linkage
and then decide either to accept or reject the call. Such a
decision may consider several factors to determine how im-
portant or useful a particular credential is. For example,
when Alice receives call credential CCBC from Charlie the
factors that will inﬂuence Alice’s decision to accept the call
are: (1) How strong is CCBC?, and (2) How fresh is CCBC?
The strength of the credential is dependent on the call
duration value encapsulated within it. Thus, Bob speak-
ing to Charlie for an hour will generate a stronger creden-
tial than Bob speaking to Charlie for a couple of minutes.
Alice’s UA also checks for the freshness of the credential.
For this we assume that the UA’s have access to approx-
imately synchronized common clocks and we believe most
phones will be time synchronized in a commercial VoIP de-
ployment. Alice’s UA can be conﬁgured with a policy stat-
ing that only call credentials with durations greater than a
particular threshold, say TCD, and timestamps within a cer-
tain time window shall be considered. We use the average
call duration of the user as the value for TCD, that is
TCD =
P
Durationof Callsmadeby user
Totalnumberof callsmadeby user
.
A simpler scenario is when Alice speaks to Bob and Bob
later wants to talk to Alice. Bob can use the credential
that Alice provided to him. In this case there is a directrelationship between caller and call recipient and the call
can be accepted. In general, calls are accepted only if there
exists, between caller and call recipient either a direct rela-
tionship, or a transitive single hop SN linkage. We restrict
the linkage to a single hop because then callers can only use
credentials directly presented to them. This restricts misuse
of credentials and keeps the design simple.
In our evaluation of CallRank each UA maintains a record
of all the people he called and a list of call credentials from
users who made calls. When making a call the user can
present these credentials as part of the initial INV ITE re-
quest until a suitable credential is found. The call recipient’s
decision to accept or reject a call is at the UA level and no
other SIP component needs to get involved. This forms a
scalable, load distributed solution as each UA is responsi-
ble for the calls it accepts or rejects. In most commercial
phones, similar call history information is maintained under
Dialled Calls and Received Calls. We can extend Received
Calls to also store the call credentials.
We can consider a third factor that can inﬂuence Alice’s
decision of accepting a credential from Bob: (3) How reputed
is Bob?. This reputation can either be Bob’s reputation with
respect to Alice or system wide reputation assigned to Bob.
This is an interesting factor to incorporate into the system
and we plan to explore it in future work.
As users start accumulating credentials it might be hard
to present all the call credentials in the ﬁrst INV ITE re-
quest. In such a case further credentials can be presented
in subsequent INV ITE messages. Deciding how many cre-
dentials are presented in each INV ITE message, deﬁning
an upper limit on the number of subsequent INV ITE mes-
sages and determining an optimal way to perform this initial
handshake of credentials are all topics for future work. In
our present implementation, the case where no credential is
found is handled in Section 3.3.
3.2.1 Evaluating Threats to SN Based Scheme
If a spammer needs to defeat our SN based model and
make a call to a particular user, he will have to penetrate
the immediate SN of the user. Consider the scenario where
a spammer wants to call Alice. He will either have to get a
call credential directly from Alice or from someone to whom
Alice makes calls. Since it is unlikely that a legitimate user,
such as Alice, or her immediate SN will call the spammer
and talk to him for suﬃciently long periods of time, the
spammer will ﬁnd it hard to obtain such a credential.
Assume, however, that the spammer manages to convince
a user Bob (who is part of Alice’s immediate SN) to talk to
him for a suﬃcient duration. This may happen when Bob
inadvertently calls the spammer once. Since the spammer
now has a credential from Bob, he is able to spam everyone
who makes calls to Bob including Alice. However, the fresh-
ness constraint of the credential will only allow the spammer
a short time window. If the spammer, on the other hand,
is able to get Bob to call him regularly, then he will have a
constant supply of fresh credentials. In such a case Alice on
receiving a spam call can now decide that she will no longer
accept calls which present call credentials from Bob. If the
spammer needs to disseminate information to a large num-
ber of users, he will need to penetrate all their SNs (possibly
disjoint) in a similar fashion.
The down side of our SN scheme is that there will be
situations where even legitimate users will not be able to use
Figure 3: Global Reputation Scheme
call credentials because there exists no SN linkage between
them or no SN linkage can be agreed upon after the initial
handshake. The global reputation scheme discussed in the
next section will be used to address this problem.
3.3 Global Reputation Using Eigentrust
Over the course of some period of time, assume that Alice
talks to Bob, Charlie and Dave and the talk times are as
shown in Figure 3. We can use call duration to represent
the reputation value that Alice implicitly assigns to people
she calls. Formally, the normalized local reputation value
that a user i assigns to a user j is can be speciﬁed as
rij =
Durationof allcallsmadeby useritoj
Durationof allcallsmadeby useritoany user
. (1)
This ensures that rij is between 0 and 1 and for any row
i,
P
∀j rij = 1. The reputations assigned using this method
are similar to the normalized local trust values in the Eigen-
trust system[10]. The advantage of normalizing is that rep-
utation values are not arbitrarily high or low. This prevents
users who form a malicious collective from assigning a high
reputation value to other users in the collective and low val-
ues to legitimate users.
The ﬁrst row in Figure 3 represents Alice’s reputation val-
ues towards Bob, Charlie and Dave based on equation (1).
Similarly the reputation values that Bob, Charlie and Dave
assign to each other and Alice can be calculated and form the
subsequent rows in a reputation matrix, R. For the system
comprising only of Alice, Bob, Charlie and Dave, the repu-
tation matrix is shown in Figure 3. If we need a system wide
view of reputation values then we have to aggregate these lo-
cal reputation values. We discussed in Section 2.3 that this
is the leading left eigenvector, λ, of the matrix R. λi then
represents the reputation of user i as perceived by the system
as a whole. In calculating the leading eigenvector, we use
the power method speciﬁed in [6]. The minor diﬀerence be-
tween our implementation and the power method presented
in [6] is that in each iteration, we normalized the computed
trust vector using its 1-norm (the method in [6] uses the
2-norm). Using the 1-norm ensures that the ﬁnal computed
eigenvector λ satisﬁes  λ 1 = 1, i.e.,
P
i λi = 1. Note that
each component λi of the vector λ satisﬁes 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1 due
to the characteristics of the matrix R. Thus the system as a
whole has a total possible reputation of 1 and each individ-
ual has some fraction of this reputation. Using the 1-norm
over the 2-norm should not aﬀect the convergence rate in
general since the normalization step in the power method
can be done using any vector norm.Proxies that provide billing services maintain call duration
information for all users within their domain. The proxy is,
therefore, the best place to maintain and update the repu-
tation matrix. Periodically it can calculate and update the
leading eigenvector of the matrix. In addition the proxy
can also include users (from other domains) who have either
made or received calls to or from this domain in its repu-
tation matrix. In CallRank, when a proxy server receives a
call request it consults the eigenvector calculated to obtain
the reputation value for the caller and appends this informa-
tion to the request. This reputation information can be sent
securely to the call recipient as this only requires a secure
path between the call recipient and his proxy (within a do-
main we can hope to use strong security mechanisms). The
call recipient can then decide based on a threshold value if
the calls will be accepted. Ensuring that only the call recip-
ient’s proxy appends a reputation value thwarts the attack
that spammers can employ - creating their own proxy and
providing high reputation values for their spam calls.
3.3.1 EvaluatingThreatstoGlobalReputationScheme
We discussed how it is hard for a spammer to penetrate
a legitimate user’s SN and thus compromise CallRank’s ef-
fectiveness. It is equally hard for the spammer to obtain a
high global reputation value. This is because the reputation
value is based on call interactions with a number of users
and takes into account the reputation of these users. If a
spammer needs to have a high reputation value, he will need
a signiﬁcant number of moderately reputed users to call him
and speak for signiﬁcantly long durations. This is unlikely
to occur. A legitimate user, on the other hand, will have
a high reputation value due to call interactions with other
legitimate users (a feedback loop). This implies that Call-
Rank can counter attacks where new identities are created
each time the old ones are ﬂagged as malicious (as done in
a Blacklist). This is because the new identities are only ac-
cepted as legitimate when they can provide SN credentials
or garner signiﬁcant reputation values.
In the case of Sybil attacks[5], where a small number of en-
tities counterfeit multiple identities to compromise the sys-
tem we note that CallRank is fairly resistant. If the entities
themselves have weak SN linkages or low reputation values,
then creating new identities will not help at all. If the en-
tities, however, have strong SN linkages or high reputation
values, then the identities they create can be made reputable
or provided with these linkages. In such a scenario the sys-
tem will soon realize that credentials coming from this set
of entities lead to spam calls following which the reputation
of the entities and the identities they have created begin
to drop, therefore aﬀecting their ability to continue making
spam calls.
3.4 The Introduction Problem
When a new legitimate user joins a VoIP system he has
no SN linkages in that system and a low reputation value.
This will change if other users call him, thereby increasing
his reputation value and providing him with call credentials.
However, other users are unaware of his entry into the VoIP
system. In order to notify other users he will need to make
the ﬁrst call. In CallRank, however, all calls he makes will
be ﬂagged as spam calls, which amounts to a false positive.
We can ﬁx this by combining CallRank with other schemes
proposed for VoIP spam such as an audio Turing test or a
computational puzzle. When a user is ﬂagged as a spammer
he will then be subject to the Turing test or a computational
puzzle or even a personalized question from the call recipient
(what is my high school nickname). The call is accepted if
the caller is able to successfully answer any of these tests.
In our simulation we have not included such a Turing test
and this forms part of our future work.
3.5 Call Credentials
The call credential needs to have accurate and secure in-
formation about the call durations. A call credential CC
consists of A, the identity of the caller, B, the identity of the
call recipient, t, the call duration and TS, the time stamp
of the call along with a digital signature of the same infor-
mation. We assume that each user has a public/private key
pair which is used to generate the digital signature. If not
already available, this pair can be generated by the UA on
ﬁrst use. Associating a public key with a particular user is
done with key rings in the manner proposed in [11], thus
avoiding the use of an infrastructure such as the PKI.
The accuracy of the information within the credential can
be veriﬁed by the proxy which also records call duration in-
formation. We assume the proxy has an accurate value of
call duration as it provides billing services. Therefore, the
proxy does not need call credentials for calculating reputa-
tion values. In fact, if the proxy is used to determine the SN
linkage for a call, we do not need call credentials. However,
we believe moving the SN linkage detection to the proxy
makes the system unscalable.
To understand the call credential better, we consider what
it means from a human perspective. This credential is a
record of the user’s past observed behavior in the system
or his call history. If the user is an active member of a
particular VoIP community, making and receiving calls, he
will accumulate the community relevant credentials through
his interactions, making it easier to identify him accurately
within the community. If for some reason there is a suf-
ﬁciently long break from the community then when he re-
enters, he will once again have to reestablish himself. This
is how it works in the real world. Since credential collection
can be done by the user’s phone without any input from the
user there is minimal impact on usability. Using call dura-
tion as a building block has the following advantages. It is
(i) implicit, (ii) quantiﬁable (iii) easily veriﬁable, and (iv)
easily understood.
3.6 Discussion of CallRank Algorithm
To summarize, the CallRank algorithm works as follows.
On receipt of a call setup message, the UA ﬁrst checks to see
if any call credentials presented by the caller belong to users
to whom the UA has made calls. If such a credential is found
and it satisﬁes the policy duration and freshness constraints,
the call is accepted. If no credential satisﬁes the constraints
then the algorithm checks the reputation value of the caller.
If this satisﬁes a particular acceptable reputation threshold,
then the call is accepted else it is rejected. Rather than
rejecting the call the caller can be made to go through a
Turing test or a call recipient speciﬁc computational puzzle.
However we propose to explore this in future work.
Integrating the CallRank algorithm into SIP will require
that the initial INV ITE message also carry call credentials
as well as proxy appended reputation scores. Clients that do
not implement the CallRank algorithm can simply choose toignore this information.
CallRank does have some limitations. The ﬁrst limitation
is that legitimate users, who make a large number of outgo-
ing calls but receive very few incoming ones, would not be
able to collect call credentials. Typical examples are emer-
gency services and banks. Since these systems are part of
critical infrastructure, they can be seeded with high global
reputation values. The second concern is one of privacy as
the collection of call credentials provides a user with the
call history information of their immediate SN. We plan to
address this limitation as part of future work.
4. CALLRANK EVALUATION
An evaluation of CallRank in the real world would re-
quire call logs from a VoIP system along with actual cases
of VoIP spam. Call logs are hard to come by due to privacy
concerns and VoIP spam is still not widespread enough. In-
stead, we simulate CallRank with a synthetic call workload
to evaluate its eﬀectiveness, ensuring that the simulations
model real world call characteristics as closely as possible.
In particular, we measure how CallRank can be used to dis-
tinguish between legitimate callers and spammers and the
results are discussed in Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. We study
the acceptance of a legitimate caller into the CallRank sys-
tem in Section 4.4.
Our initial experimental setup consists of DNS, proxy and
statistics servers and user agents (phones). Initially, only
the DNS and the statistics server are running. Each proxy
server registers with the DNS server, and the user agents
(UAs) register with the proxy. UAs either behave as reputed
users (seeded with high reputation values), legitimate users
(users who make legitimate calls but are not seeded with
high reputation values), or as spammers. A legitimate or
a reputed UA makes calls to other phones with inter call
and call duration values that are Poisson distributed. The
choice of call recipient is Zipﬁan distributed. Spamming
UAs, however, make calls to as many other UAs as possible.
Call setup goes through the proxies which consult the
DNS server and then route the call to the proxy in the call
recipient’s domain, which in turn forwards the call to the
call recipient. During the learning period (which can be
set), a call recipient will accept all calls. After the learning
period, a call is accepted or rejected based on the work-
ing of CallRank. All call interactions are recorded at the
statistics server which tracks the number of accepted and
rejected calls for both legitimate users and spammers. Our
initial setup consists of three domains each served by a proxy
server and 200 users initially registered in each domain. 1%
of the 600 users are reputed. The number of spammers and
regular users is varied based on the experiment. We use a
simulated call workload model. To simulate call processing
for a suﬃcient period of time, 100 seconds of machine time
models 1 day of simulated time.
4.1 Effect of Spammers
The ﬁrst set of experiments determines the eﬀect of spam-
mers on CallRank. Three runs are conducted where the
spammers present are varied from 1%, 10% and 20% and
the fraction of spam calls accepted for each case is measured.
The results are as shown in Figure 4 which plots the fraction
of spam calls accepted with time. When legitimate users
join the system they have a learning period during which
they accept ALL calls. This period is essential for the user
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Figure 4: Eﬀect of spammers
to gather credentials and build reputation. However, during
this period, they are vulnerable to spam calls. The spammer
thus needs to detect a new user within the learning period
time window and then send all the spam they can generate.
In our simulation the learning period for all UAs is ﬁxed at
1 day. All 3 lines initially show increase as spammers learn
about more and more legitimate users and are able to send
spam to them successfully. This increase lasts roughly for
the learning period and then starts decreasing rapidly. This
is because legitimate users, using the CallRank scheme, are
able to diﬀerentiate between spammers and legitimate users
soon after their learning periods. For all 3 lines there are no
new spam calls accepted after 4.5 days.
As the percentage of spammers increases from 1% to 10%
and then to 20%, the probability of some spammer discover-
ing a legitimate user increases and the ability to send larger
amounts of spam increases as well. This is seen in Figure
4 as each of the curves shows higher false negative rates of
1%, 10% and 22% respectively. Thus, the false positive rate
increases linearly with the number of spammers. However,
these numbers are contingent on the fact that legitimate
users are discovered by spammers within their short learning
period time window. If the legitimate user is undiscovered
then the rates will drop down even further. In fact, once
a legitimate user crosses his learning period, he is able to
identify spammers (old and new) with ease.
4.2 Addition of New Spammers
We start with an initial population of 600 UAs, 1% of
which are reputed UAs, 10% spammer UAs and the rest are
legitimate UAs. We wait until the system stabilizes, that is
no new spam calls are accepted or no new legitimate calls
are rejected. From Figure 5 we see this occurs after 2 days
and the number of accepted spam calls has saturated around
1000 calls. We then add spammers, 1%, 10% and then 20%
of the current UA population. As seen, the addition of these
spammers does not increase the number of accepted spam
calls illustrating that CallRank’s mechanisms ensure that
new spammers do not aﬀect existing legitimate users. The
reason behind this is that a new spammer, when introduced,
does not have any SN linkage or reputation. Therefore, ex-
isting legitimate users will not accept any calls originating
from them. Thereafter a spammer, due to his behavior, will
not improve either his SN or reputation implying that at no
stage will a legitimate user accept a call from him. This is 0
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Figure 6: Adding legitimate users
a big advantage of the CallRank scheme where older users
by virtue of their good call history become more adept at
rejecting spam calls.
The addition of new spammers generates more spam and
we can see this in the increase in the number of rejected spam
calls in Figure 5. At each stage of the introduction (marked
by arrows) we can see an increase in the slope of rejected
spam calls thus corroborating CallRank’s eﬀectiveness.
4.3 False Positives
Although not shown in the previous experiments, the false
positive rates are also extremely low. For example in the
simulation run that involved 600 users, 1% of whom are re-
puted and 10% are spammers, there were only 3 calls that
were wrongly rejected to give a false positive rate of .02%.
This low rate is because all users are introduced at the same
time and their learning periods coincide. Therefore, all users
were simultaneously aware of the rest of the users by the
end of this period. However, in a realistic scenario users
join a system over a period of time. To simulate this we
created 600 users, 200 in each domain, over a period of 10
days. Within a domain, new users are added at intervals of
3 hours (simulated time). The false positive rate of such a
system is shown in Figure 6. The rate initially increases to
a high of 3% and then reduces gradually. This is because
when a user joins the system, he has no SN linkage and no
reputation which by CallRank’s perspective is the charac-
teristics of a spammer. Therefore, most of his calls will be
rejected. However, if the user behaves legitimately, this rate
drops soon enough showing that CallRank is able to deter-
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Figure 7: Legitimate user acceptance
mine that the user is legitimate. False positives do not have
the same connotation as in the email world, where it implies
a permanent loss of information. In the VoIP world, since
interactions are synchronous, a user whose call is rejected
can be asked to take an audio Turing test. This will only re-
sult in occasional longer call setup times, typically occurring
when the user initially joins the system.
4.4 User Acceptance
We studied the acceptance of a legitimate user into a sys-
tem containing 1000 existing users. This is shown in Figure
7. As we can see a legitimate user is accepted by half the
total user base in 3.5 days. However, this factor can be
used by a spammer to alternate between being a legitimate
user and a spammer, thus, providing him with the ability to
spam a large set of users. This threat is not as large as it
seems because behaving as a legitimate user entails getting
people with signiﬁcant SN linkages or moderate reputation
values to talk to the spammer on a regular basis. When
a legitimate user joins a voice communication system, al-
most immediately there are other legitimate users who talk
to him, thus creating his SN and establishing his reputa-
tion. This happens naturally for most people who have an
established life outside the VoIP system. Their SN linkages
or their reputations are just extensions of their real world
persona. On the other hand a spammer has no existence
outside the VoIP system, and so, legitimate users will never
call him when he gets introduced into the system.
We also see that the graph in Figure 7 saturates at 70%
(say set S) of the user base. That implies that anytime this
user calls any of the users belonging to the remaining 30%
(S
′), he will be treated as a spammer. This is because there
exists no SN linkage between the user and members of S
′
and the user’s reputation value is signiﬁcantly lower than
users in S
′. From our logs we see that S
′ consist of either
the initially pre-reputed users or users that have been in the
system in a legitimate fashion long enough to have become
extremely reputed. This behavior is beneﬁcial as it implies
spamming highly reputed users is going to be signiﬁcantly
hard.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we proposed CallRank, a system that uses
call duration to determine if a caller is a spammer. Our sim-
ulation explored the eﬀectiveness of CallRank and showed
that it adapts over time, allowing users with legitimate call
history to make calls easily while defeating spammers. Inaddition, our system is able to accept new legitimate users
relatively easily while ensuring that new spammers are not
able to aﬀect existing users. In the future we plan to explore
mechanisms that maintain privacy of users by creating ag-
gregate call credentials for a group of users.
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